Overview
Most people remember Nokia as a phone. The company that exists today is something else: a Finnish supplier of the equipment and software that carry the world's mobile, fixed and optical traffic. It sells radio base stations to telecom operators, routers and optical systems to cloud and data-centre companies, and licences for a large patent portfolio to device makers. In 2025 it reported net sales of €19.9 billion and comparable operating profit of about €2.0 billion, according to its full-year report.
It has reinvented itself more often than almost any large company in Europe: from a pulp mill to an industrial conglomerate, to the world's biggest handset maker, to a network business. Each change was forced by the decline of the thing that came before.
History
Fredrik Idestam, a mining engineer, opened a wood-pulp mill near Tampere in 1865. He later moved the operation to the banks of the Nokianvirta river, and the company took its name from the town that grew up there. For a century Nokia was one strand of Finnish heavy industry. In 1967 it merged with Finnish Rubber Works and Finnish Cable Works, producing a conglomerate that made paper, boots, tyres, cables, televisions and, almost incidentally, telecoms equipment.
That last line mattered. Nokia helped build the Nordic NMT mobile network in the early 1980s, and in July 1991 the world's first call on a GSM network was made in Finland on equipment Nokia had supplied. When the group ran into trouble at the start of the 1990s, its board turned to Jorma Ollila, a former Citibank banker who had been running the mobile-phones division. Named chief executive in 1992, he sold the rubber, cable, paper and consumer-electronics businesses and staked the company on mobile.
The bet paid off on a scale few predicted. By 1998 Nokia was the world's largest mobile-phone maker, and at its peak it sold roughly one phone in three worldwide. It became the backbone of Finland's exports and stock market. The fall was almost as fast. Apple's iPhone in 2007 and Google's Android soon after turned phones into software platforms, and Nokia's Symbian lagged. Stephen Elop, chief executive from 2010, chose Microsoft's Windows Phone in 2011; the share loss continued, and in September 2013 Nokia agreed to sell its handset business to Microsoft for about €5.4 billion, completed in April 2014. HustleMemo's long read, The Man Who Made (and Unmade?) Nokia, weighs how much of that decline was set up during the strongest years.
What remained was the networks business. Nokia bought out Siemens's half of their joint venture Nokia Siemens Networks in 2013, then acquired France's Alcatel-Lucent, including the Bell Labs research arm, in a deal completed in January 2016. In February 2025 it closed the purchase of Infinera, an American optical-networking company, to push further into data-centre connections.
How the business works
Nokia makes money in three broad ways. The largest is mobile infrastructure: radio equipment and software that operators buy to build and upgrade 4G and 5G networks, a market that rises and falls with their spending cycles. The second is network infrastructure: IP routers, optical transport and fixed broadband, increasingly sold to cloud providers and AI data centres as well as to operators. The third is patent licensing through Nokia Technologies, which collects royalties from phone makers and others on decades of standards-essential inventions. Licensing is small in revenue but highly profitable.
The phones that still carry the brand are made by HMD, a Finnish company that has licensed the Nokia name since 2016. Nokia earns a licence fee, not phone revenue.
The current strategy is a bet on artificial intelligence. In October 2025 Nvidia agreed to invest $1 billion in Nokia for about 2.9% of its shares, and the two companies said they would build AI-native radio networks on Nvidia computing. For 2026 Nokia reorganised its reporting into two segments, Network Infrastructure and Mobile Infrastructure.
Ownership and leadership
Nokia is listed on Nasdaq Helsinki and the New York Stock Exchange and has no controlling shareholder. Its investors are mostly funds and institutions; Nvidia joined them in 2025. Justin Hotard, an American who previously ran Intel's data-centre and AI business, has been president and chief executive since 1 April 2025, succeeding Pekka Lundmark. At the annual general meeting on 9 April 2026, the board elected Timo Ihamuotila, a former Nokia finance chief, as chair, succeeding Sari Baldauf. The company says it employed about 78,000 people on average in 2025.
Controversies
PROVEN: deep job cuts. The move away from phones and the later restructurings cost tens of thousands of jobs, many in Finland. In October 2023 Nokia announced a cost programme that it said could remove up to 14,000 roles.
DISPUTED: the leadership culture behind the decline. Risto Siilasmaa, chairman from 2012, described in his 2018 book a top management that avoided bad news. Many readers took that as a judgement on the Ollila years; Ollila has called such accounts exaggerated. It remains an argument about judgement, not wrongdoing.
PROVEN, personal: a disclosure fine. In 2014 Ollila was fined €3,000 in Finland for failing to disclose a Luxembourg investment company. It concerned him, not Nokia.
Why it matters
Nokia is the clearest European case study of a company that won one technology era decisively and lost the next. It also shows that losing is not always the end. The business that survived the phone collapse is smaller and less famous but still sits inside most of the world's networks, and its partnership with Nvidia is an attempt to stay relevant as AI changes what networks are for. For a Finnish counterpoint about staying small on purpose, read HustleMemo's story of Supercell's Ilkka Paananen.